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Multi-Characteristic Status Situations 
and the
Determination of Power and Prestige Orders
In this paper we consider how performance expectations are formed and 
power and prestige orders are determined in multi-characteristic status situa­
tions. This problem is an extension of earlier studies that have demonstrated 
the importance of previously established status characteristics in determining 
the power and prestige order that emerges in small task-oriented groups.
(See, for example, Torrance, 1957; Katz, Goldston and Benjamin, 1958.) Research 
specifically addressed to this problem has shown that task behavior of group 
members who are differentiated on a single status characteristic or evaluative 
dimension is directly related to their relative states of this characteristic. 
That is, group members who possess the more highly evaluated state of the 
differentiating characteristic will tend to exercise greater influence on the 
task outcomes than those members who possess the less highly evaluated state 
of the characteristic. This phenomenon has been observed when the differ­
entiating characteristic is of a diffuse nature, such as educational level 
and military rank, even if this characteristic is not initially relevant to 
the group's task (Moore, 1968; Cohen, Berger and Zelditch, forthcoming), and 
also when the differentiating characteristic is a specific status characteris­
tic instrumental to the group's task (Berger and Conner, 1969).
Berger and Conner (1969) explain these results by arguing that members of 
task-oriented groups come to develop through time stable conceptions of the 
performance capacities of each other. These conceptions, or performance 
expectations, are beliefs about the relative task abilities of individuals 
that the members of the group come to hold. Typically these expectations will
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be differentiated; that is, they will be conceptions of inequalities in the 
task abilities of the group members. If differentiated, these performance 
expectations legitimate and determine differences in the power and prestige 
positions that develop in the group: inequalities in opportunities to perform, 
in performance rates, in evaluations of members' contributions, and in the 
relative influence of the different members on the decisions of the group.
In this sense the group's ordering of power and prestige positions is said to 
be a function of a structure of performance expectations its members come to 
hold. In the situation where the members of a task group are differentiated 
in terms of a diffuse status characteristic (age, sex, occupation, etc.), such 
differentiation provides a basis in terms of which these performance expecta­
tions are formed. That is, distinctions in task expectations come to coincide 
with the evaluational distinctions on the status characteristic (Berger, Cohen 
and Zelditch, 1966). In the case where the members of a task group are 
differentiated in terms of a specific status characteristic, task expectations 
are provided by the performance conceptions already associated with the charac­
teristic. Thus, through their relation to performance expectations, differ­
entiating status characteristics determine the ordering of power and prestige 
positions in the task-oriented group.*
Research along these lines leads us to the problem of multi-characteristic 
status differentiation. This is the situation in which the members of the 
task-oriented group are differentiated on one or more status characteristics, 
each of which is instrumental to their task, and each of which carries
*For an application of the expectation argument to the situation where 
the members of the task-oriented group are not initially differentiated in 
terms of a specific or diffuse status characteristic, see Berger, Conner and 
McKeown (1969) and Fisek (1969).
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information about expected performance capacities. The determination of power 
and prestige orders appears to be straightforward when the distribution of 
status characteristics is consistent; that is, when each member of the group 
possesses similarly evaluated states of the characteristics. In this case 
the power and prestige order of the group should be a direct function of the 
distribution of the states of the characteristics. The relationship is less 
clear, however, when the distribution of status characteristics is inconsistent. 
Such a situation arises when at least one member of the group possesses 
dissimilarly evaluated states of the characteristics, and these are providing 
incongruent or contradictory performance information, e.g., that an individual 
has "high" performance capacities and at the same time "low" performance 
capacities with respect to the group's task. Here we may ask how group 
members cognitively define such inconsistencies, and what are the consequences 
of such definitions for their behavior in the group.*
In a recent study we attempted to discover the mode of cognitive defini­
tion in such a situation (Berger and Fisek, 1970). Two modes, a "balancing" 
mechanism and a "combining" mechanism, were postulated, and an experiment was 
designed to discriminate between the two processes. The results provided 
support for the combining mechanism argument.
Further consideration of this experiment suggested that the design 
employed may have limited the import of the results to a special case, and it
*It should be noted that our theoretical problem ties in with another 
line of research that has long been of considerable interest to sociologists, 
that concerned with status equilibration or congruency (Lenski, 1956; Homans, 
1961; Zelditch and Anderson, 1966). Traditionally, however, this research has 
focused on diffuse status characteristics and on the operation of these charac­
teristics in more general settings than those of immediate interest to us. In 
this connection it should also be noted that Sampson (1963) has presented a 
theoretical framework for analyzing status congruencies that has many simi­
larities to our own approach.
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was decided to conduct a second experiment with additional conditions. The 
second experiment was designed to incorporate new discriminating predictions 
from our original formulations of the "balancing" and "combining" mechanism 
arguments, and it was felt that these results would provide a broader empirical 
base for evaluating these two modes of cognitive definition. In the remainder 
of this paper we report on the cumulative findings of both experiments and 
suggest how expectations are formed and the power and prestige orders are de­
termined in multi-characteristic status situations.
Theoretical Alternatives
Given that the members of a task-oriented group are differentiated on one 
or more socially valued characteristics instrumental to their task and which 
are allocated in a consistent or inconsistent manner, how will the members of 
such groups form performance expectations, and how will these expectations be 
related to the group's power and prestige orders? This is our theoretical 
problem, and to facilitate our analysis we shall conceptualize it in terms of 
a simplified theoretical framework.
We imagine a group containing two or more actors. However, we view the 
group from the point of view of one actor, say p, while the other actors are 
treated as objects of orientation to p. For purposes of experimental study 
we confine our attention to two persons, p and o.
P and o are engaged in the solution of some task, which for simplicity 
we view as having only two outcomes, "success" or "failure." The task may be 
almost any kind of activity involving a series of contributions or problem 
solving attempts by one or more of the actors. Moreover, the members of the 
group are committed to the successful completion of the task, and it is both 
legitimate and crucial for them to take each other's behavior into account in
order to achieve this outcome. In this sense, the group is "task focused," 
and its members are "collectively oriented" in solving their problem.
We assume that there exist in this situation a number of specific status 
characteristics. A characteristic, C, is some aspect or property of an 
individual that might be used to describe him. For C to be a t^a_tus_ character­
istic we require that it consist of at least two states which are differentially 
evaluated in terms of honor, esteem, desirability. For C to be a specific 
status characteristic, specific performance expectations must be associated 
with its states. These are beliefs about how an individual possessing a given 
state of C will perform in defined or specified task situations. Mathematical 
ability, for example, may function as a specific status characteristic. We 
distinguish different levels of this characteristic, assign differential social 
values to these levels (positive and negative), and associate beliefs about 
the different performance capacities of individuals possessing the different 
states of the characteristic. Again to simplify our analysis, we assume that 
there exist just two such characteristics in our situation, and C ^ . Each 
characteristic involves two states that are differentially evaluated--one 
positively and the other negatively--and associated with these states are the 
beliefs that individuals possessing them also possess, respectively, "high" 
and "low" performance capacities with respect to a task for which these charac­
teristics are relevant. In our situation, we assume that it is given that p 
and o know that they are differentiated (possess different states) with 
respect to either or C ^ , that these status characteristics are relevant to 
their task, and that they are of equal weight. Within this framework we can 
now consider how different distributions of the states of these status
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ncharacteristics are related to different possible power and prestige orders 
that might emerge in the group.
First we consider the case involving a consistent distribution of the 
states of the characteristics. The states of the characteristics possessed 
by each individual have the same or consistent evaluations so that all 
positively evaluated states are possessed by one individual, and all negatively 
evaluated states are possessed by the second. As already noted, this case 
would appear to present no new theoretical issues when compared with the sit­
uation in which there is a single characteristic (diffuse or specific) which 
differentiates the members of the group. We assume that given two or more 
differentiating status characteristics relevant to the group's task, if these 
characteristics are allocated in a consistent manner, their effect on the 
group's power and prestige order will be similar to that of a single differ­
entiating characteristic. The actor who possesses the positively evaluated 
states will hold a higher position on the power and prestige order than the 
actor who possesses the negatively evaluated states. The first individual 
will receive more action opportunities, make more performance outputs, be more 
likely to have these positively evaluated, and exercise more influence than 
the second individual.
The case where there is an inconsistent distribution of differentiating 
characteristics is considerably more complex. This is the situation where at 
least one of the group members, p or o, possesses states of the character­
istics that do not have consistent evaluations--for example, p possesses the 
positively evaluated state of and the negatively evaluated state of •
Here the actor has two bases for forming his performance expectations, and 
the information they provide is contradictory. The information provided by
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one characteristic is that p has a "high" performance capacity relative to o 
on this task, while that conveyed by the second is that he has a "low" per­
formance capacity relative to o on the task. We assume that p comes to cope 
with this problem, and that through the operation of some particular cognitive 
mechanism he comes to form performance expectations that enable him to interact 
effectively in the situation. We further assume that the cognitive mechanism 
that operates to determine the formation of performance expectations in this 
case will also be operative in the situation where the distribution of status 
characteristics is consistent. Thus in determining which mechanism operates 
in the case of inconsistent distributions, we are trying to determine more 
generally how expectations will form in situations in which two or more status 
characteristics are task-significant.
On theoretical grounds, two alternative modes of cognitively defining 
the situation seem possible. The first, which we call a "balancing" mechanism^ 
is based on some of the general ideas to be found in the literature on cog­
nitive consistency theories (Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953). Applying this line 
of thinking to our problem, we reason that the actor p will tend to cognitively 
balance his situation so as to form performance expectations for self and 
other that correspond with a distribution of states of characteristics that is 
consistent or univalent for each individual. When the distribution of the 
states of characteristics is such that each actor already possesses con­
sistently or univalently evaluated states, p will form his expectations based 
on the actual distribution of status characteristics. When the distribution 
of status characteristics is inconsistent, p is expected to cognitively alter 
the situation. If p possesses, for example, the positively evaluated state 
of and the negatively evaluated state of C2> he might use only one of these
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characteristics as the basis on which he forms task expectations. Or, he 
might decide that the information regarding the inconsistent characteristics 
is erroneous and that he in fact possesses states with similar evaluations.
The particular manner of balancing the situation, such as the two just con­
sidered, is likely to depend on the context of the specific situation. What 
is important, however, is that according to this line of reasoning the actor 
will form expectations that correspond to a perceived distribution of states 
that is consistent or univalent for each individual. Consequently, in terms 
of the conditions of our problem where only two states are distinguished on 
C^ and C^, different distributions of these characteristics will result in 
p's forming one of two expectation states for self and other־־either "high" 
or "low." Through the operation of the balancing mechanism, different dis­
tributions will be reduced to a unique balanced structure.*
The second mode of cognitively defining the situation that we considered 
is one which we refer to as a "combining" mechanism. The ideas involved here 
are loosely associated with those from information and decision-making 
theories. According to this mechanism, the actor operates essentially as an 
information processing system, taking into account all information available 
to him regarding the relevant status characteristics and the task in the sit­
uation. Thus in forming expectations for self and other, p will use the i n ­
formation provided by both characteristics. In a manner which we cannot as 
yet precisely describe, he will combine the performance information given by 
each of these characteristics in forming resultant expectation states. When 
p is confronted with a consistent distribution of equally weighted status
*More generally, this argument leads us to expect that the number of 
different expectation states p can form is limited to the number of differ­
entially evaluated states distinguished on the status characteristics possessed 
by the members of his group.
characteristics, his resultant expectations will simply reflect the "high" and 
"low" performance conceptions associated with the states of these character­
istics. When p is confronted with an inconsistent distribution of these 
states, when a group member has "high" performance capacity on and "low" on 
C^, he will form a resultant expectation state lying somewhere between "high" 
and "low": an "average" level state. Thus under this mechanism, the combined 
expectations that p will form for self and other can assume a large number of 
different values ranging from "high" to "low" and depending on the particular 
distribution of the characteristics in the situation.
Since there were no clearcut theoretical grounds to favor one of these 
cognitive defining mechanisms over the other, we designed and conducted two 
experiments to enable us to discriminate between them. These experiments 
correspond with the simplified theoretical structure developed in this section.
The Experiments
The research reported here was carried out in two experiments. In the 
first experiment we created three conditions or different distributions of spe­
cific status characteristics, two consistent and one inconsistent. The results 
of this experiment provided clear support for the combining mechanism argument, 
but we thought they might be restricted to the special inconsistent condition we 
had investigated. Accordingly, we ran a second, identical experiment three 
months later with two additional inconsistent conditions to allow us to contrast 
additional predictions from our original sets of assumptions. It is advisable to 
consider simultaneously the data from both experiments when evaluating the two 
defining mechanisms, so we are reporting this research as a single unit.
In the first phase of the experiment we created two specific status 
characteristics and assigned states of these characteristics to two subjects.
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We then put the subjects in a standardized experimental situation where we 
could measure the likelihood of each subject being influenced by the other.
This measure of influence was used as the indicator of the power and prestige 
position of the individual in the group.
When they arrived at the experimental laboratory the subjects were 
taken to separate rooms where they were given two written tests designed to 
establish two fictional abilities, or specific status characteristics, on 
which the subjects could be differentiated. One test claimed to measure 
"Meaning Insight Ability," described as a basic ability of the individual.
It contained fictional word association problems in which an English word is 
matched with the supposed phonetic spellings of two non-English words from a 
language unknown to the subjects. They were asked to determine which of the 
two non-English words had the same meaning as the English word. The other 
test measured "Relational Insight," another basic ability. It asked the 
subject to determine which of two ancient Japanese ideographs had the same 
pronunciation as that given by the phonetic spelling of a Japanese word, 
regardless of their meanings. There were twenty problems in each test.
Previous experience has shown these tests to be vague and yet believable 
enough to allow the experimenter to induce a subject's belief and confidence 
in almost any score. They provide an efficient means for creating and randomly 
assigning states of specific status characteristics.
When the tests were completed, the subjects were taken to another room 
and seated in individual booths. The apparent purpose of the experiment was 
then explained. They were told that they would be working on a "Contrast 
Sensitivity" task requiring group decision-making and the visual judgment of 
a series of slides. Each slide showed two rectangular patterns, one above
the other, and each pattern was composed of a different arrangement of small 
black and white rectangles. The problem, they were told, was to decide for 
each slide which of the two patterns contained the greater area of white.
Like the two ability tests, this task was meant to be ambiguous, with no 
right answers. Both patterns in each slide contained the same area of white, 
and previous standardization work with the task indicated that the actual 
probability of picking either pattern was approximately .5 for each slide 
(Ofshe and Simpson, forthcoming). Although the actual sequence was maintained 
from experiment to experiment, the order of presentation was determined by 
selecting a random starting stimulus for each group to control for any lack . 
of homogeneity between stimulus slides.
The status characteristics were introduced by telling the subjects that 
since they would be working together as a group it would be helpful for them 
to know as much as possible about each other, and the tests they had taken 
earlier would provide this information. Relevance between the characteristics 
and the task was established by representing Meaning Insight Ability and 
Relational Insight Ability as being highly correlated with Contrast Sensitivity 
and with each other. People with high Meaning Insight and high Relational 
Insight abilities usually do quite well on Contrast Sensitivity problems, and 
people without these abilities usually do poorly. Furthermore, to make the 
two abilities appear equally relevant, the intrinsic properties of the tests 
themselves were constructed to be quite dissimilar from the Contrast Sensi­
tivity task.
At this point the subjects' scores were reported to them, and this repre­
sented the only variation between experimental conditions. Five conditions, 
two consistent and three inconsistent, were created from three subject
־ 11 ־
- 12 -
groupings. The two consistent conditions were created from one grouping so 
that one subject in each of these pairs was told that he had received very 
high scores on both tests, 18 and 19 out of a possible 20 each, and the other 
subject was told that he had received very low scores on both tests, 9 and 8 
out of 20. We designate these conditions as HH-LL for the consistent high 
subjects, meaning two high states (HH) for self and two low states (LL) for 
other; and LL-HH for the consistent low subject, meaning two low states for 
self and two high states for other.
One of the inconsistent conditions was created from the second subject 
grouping as one subject in each pair was told that he had received a very 
high score, 18, on one test, and a very low score, 9, on the other; while the 
other subject was told that he had received a very low score, 8, on the first 
test, and a very high score, 19, on the second. These subjects were all 
included in what we designate as the HL-LH condition, meaning an inconsistent 
high and low state for both self and other, but on different dimensions.
The other two inconsistent conditions were created from the third subject 
grouping. One subject in each of these pairs was told that he had received
very high scores, 19 and 18, on both tests; the other subject learned that he
<? /8 
received a very low score, it, on one test, and a very high score, ־№ , on the
other one. We designate these conditions as HH-LH, meaning an inconsistent
two high states for self and a low and high state for other; and as LH-HH
meaning an inconsistent low and high state for self and high states for other.
Within each grouping, the assignments of states or scores were randomly 
determined for the subjects. The reporting of tests was alternated so that an 
LH-HH subject would be low on Meaning Insight and high on Relational Insight
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in one group, and low on Relational and high on Meaning Insight in the 
next.*
To perform the Contrast Sensitivity task each subject gave an initial 
opinion of the correct answer, saw the other person's initial opinion, and,, 
then made a final decision. They were told that the exchange of information 
on initial opinion was part of the group decision-making procedure and might
V
be helpful to their own solutions of the problems, but in fact the exchange 
was controlled and built into the experiment to provide the opportunity for 
exercising influence. All communication between the subjects took place 
through the panels of an interaction control machine. One panel was located 
on each subject's desk, and it allowed him to make his initial choice by 
pressing one of two buttons, to then see the other person's initial choice 
on a signal light, and to indicate his final decision. An experimental 
assistant in a separate room could control the information on the other 
person's choice, so that the subjects could be made to see an agreeing or 
disagreeing initial choice from the other person independently of the other 
person's actual choice.
The experiment was run for twenty-five trials or Contrast Sensitivity 
slides. Twenty of these were controlled disagreements or "critical" trials
*The HH-LL, HL-LH, and LL-HH conditions were included in the first 
experiment. As already noted, the results of this experiment provided support 
for the combining mechanism argument. The influence rate for the inconsistent 
HL-LH subjects, as predicted by this argument, fell in between the rates for 
the subjects in the two consistent conditions. However, it was felt that the 
HL-LH condition, being both inconsistent and perfectly symmetric, might have 
represented a special case. It was therefore decided to run a second experi­
ment with the HH-LH and LH-HH as additional inconsistent conditions (see 
Berger and Fisek, 1970).
f
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in which both subjects thought they were disagreeing with each other. The 
five agreement trials were also controlled and were randomly distributed 
for each group with one agreement included in each successive block of five 
trials. The reason for this high proportion of disagreements was to force 
the subjects to differentiate themselves on task performance.
After the experiment the subjects were given a questionnaire to fill 
out, and when that was completed they were taken to separate rooms where 
they were extensively interviewed. The purpose of the questionnaire and 
interview was to determine the effectiveness of the experimental manipula­
tions and provide information on the cognitive sets of the subjects at the 
end of the experiment.
One hundred sixty male students from local junior colleges took part in 
these experiments. They were recruited as volunteers and were paid for their 
participation. Thirty-five of these subjects were excluded from the analysis 
of the results because they violated one or more of the initial conditions of 
the experiment, as determined in the post-experimental questionnaires and 
interviews and according to our standardized criteria.
1. Suspicion : If he became suspicious of any of the experimental 
manipulations the subject was eliminated from the sample, as were those who 
had previously read about deception experiments and thought this experiment 
similar to them, and any who had heard from others that deception was involved 
in this study.
2. Extraneous bases of differentiation between subjects: If particular 
circumstances provided him with a basis of differentiation other than the 
experimental manipulation, the subject was eliminated from the sample. All
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visible minority group members were thus excluded, and previous acquaintance 
between the two group members also resulted in exclusion.
3. Failure of experimental manipulations: If he was unable to under­
stand the instructions, or was confused about what was happening in the 
experiment, or did not understand crucial parts of the instructions such as 
the relation of the tests to the Contrast Sensitivity task, the subject was 
eliminated from the sample.
One hundred twenty-five remained in the sample after the exclusions were 
made. Of these, 26 were in the HH-LL condition, 27 in the HH-LH, 26 in the 
HL-LH, 22 in the LH-HH, and 24 in the LL-HH. The predictions and results for 
these subjects are presented in the following section.
Predictions and Results
Our measure of an individual's power and prestige position was the rate 
at which he accepted influence, given a disagreement with other. This was 
operationalized as the proportion of "stay-responses" made by a subject over 
the twenty critical trials of the experiment. A subject's response was coded 
as a "stay-response" if his final decision was the same as his initial choice, 
and was coded as a "change-response" if his final decision coincided with his 
partner's initial choice.
Arguments for the combining and balancing mechanisms lead to different 
predictions particularly for subjects in the inconsistent conditions. It is 
assumed, however, that whichever mechanism operates in inconsistent conditions 
also operates in consistent conditions, so we shall consider the results from 
both types of conditions in discriminating between mechanisms. What are the 
specific predictions which follow from the balancing and combining arguments 
for the different conditions in this experiment?
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The argument for the balancing mechanism is that all subjects will hold 
either high expectations for self and low for other, or low for self and high 
for other, and these will correspond with a perceived distribution of states 
of characteristics that is consistent or univalent for each individual. The 
individual's power and prestige position will then be directly determined by 
the "expectation advantage" he enjoys in relation to his partner. That is, 
the higher the expectations the individual holds for self relative to other, 
the higher his power and prestige position. For subjects in the HH-LL or 
LL-HH conditions, consistent distributions of states of characteristics are 
already given for each individual. The expectation structures which respect­
ively correspond to these distributions are high-self, low-other and low-self, 
high-other. Consequently, we would expect subjects in the HH-LL condition to 
be less influenced and have a higher rate of stay-responses than subjects in 
the LL-HH condition. If the balancing argument is correct, subjects in the 
inconsistent conditions would also form expectations that correspond to a 
perceived distribution of states of characteristics that is consistent or 
univalent for each individual. For this to occur, these subjects would either 
select only one of the characteristics as a basis for their expectations or by 
cognitive distortion perceive the characteristic states possessed by each 
individual as having the same value. In either event, individual subjects in 
these conditions would form either high-self, low-other or low-self, high- 
other expectation structures. Thus we would expect individual subjects in 
the inconsistent conditions to have a rate of stay-responses similar to sub­
jects in either the HH-LL or the LL-HH condition. Ideally, if the balancing 
mechanism were also operating in a uniform manner for the subjects in any 
given inconsistent condition, we should find the overall proportion in that
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particular inconsistent condition approximating the proportions in one of the 
two consistent conditions. But this may not be true, and some subjects in a 
given inconsistent condition might cognitively balance the situation by 
forming high-self, low-other expectation states and others by forming low-self, 
high-other states. We might then find the overall proportion of stay-responses 
in that particular condition diverging from the proportions in the consistent 
conditions. To the extent that this divergence occurs, however, we would 
definitely expect to find in the inconsistent condition clear evidence of bi­
modality, with some subjects having response rates similar to the HH-LL 
subjects and the rest with response rates similar to the LL-HH subjects.
The argument for the combining mechanism assumes that the individual uses 
all the information available concerning the distribution of states of charac­
teristics in forming expectation states for self and other. These expectation 
states are an "average" or some combining function of states of characteris­
tics he and the other possess. When the individual is informed that he is 
high on two equally weighted characteristics and the other is low on these 
characteristics, the HH-LL condition, he is expected to form a high-self, low- 
other expectation structure. Similarly, this argument assumes that the 
individual in the LL-HH condition will form low-self, high-other expectations. 
According to the combining mechanism, whenever subjects in inconsistent con­
ditions are confronted with the fact that they or their partners are high on 
one characteristic and low on a second equally weighted characteristic they 
will take this information into account and combine it to form expectation 
states. In such cases it is predicted the subject will form expectations for 
an "average" performance level relative to the task, somewhere between high 
and low. Thus subjects in the HH-LH condition are expected to form expectation
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states which are high for self and "average" for other, those in the HL-LH 
condition are expected to form expectation states which are "average" for self 
and "average" for other, and those in the LH-HH condition are expected to 
form expectation states which are "average" for self and high for other. 
Assuming once again that the higher the expectations an individual holds for 
self relative to other (or alternatively, the greater his "expectation advan­
tage") the higher his power and prestige position, the combining mechanism 
argument allows us to predict a specific rank order for the acceptance of 
influence for the five conditions of our study. Since subjects in the HH-LL 
condition have the greatest expectation advantage they should be least in­
fluenced and have the highest rate of stay-responses. It follows that sub­
jects in the HH-LH condition should have the second highest rate of stay- 
responses, those in the HL-LH condition the third highest, those in the LH-HH 
condition the fourth highest, and finally subjects in the LL-HH condition 
should be most influenced and have the lowest rate of stay-responses. Further­
more, we are led to expect that the distribution of the number of stay- 
responses per subject for each inconsistent condition should be uni-modal and 
similar to the distributions in the consistent conditions. The combining 
argument, in short, predicts that each inconsistent condition will be 
characterized by a rate of stay-responses that is peculiar to itself.
The experimental results are presented in Table 1. This table shows the 
proportions, mean number of stay-responses, and variances for subjects in 
each of the five conditions.
Table 1 about here
Table 1
Proportion, Mean Number of Stay-Responses, and Variance
Condition
Number of 
Subjects Proportion
Stay-Responses
Mean Variance
HH-LL* 26 .821 16.42 4.73
HH-LH+ 27 .718 14.37 8.01
HL-LH* 26 .661 13.23 5.62
LH־HH+ 22 .620 12.41 7.49
LL-HH* 24 .533 10.67 10.23
* Condition included in the first experiment 
+ Condition added for the second experiment
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It is quite apparent that the experimental results reported in Table 1 
support the assumptions of the combining mechanism argument. On the basis of 
this formulation we expected that the subjects in the five conditions of our 
experiment would develop five distinct self-other expectation structures.
Since these different expectation structures also entail differences in the 
individual's expectation advantage relative to his partner, this formulation 
led us to predict a specific ordering of rates of stay-responses for the five 
conditions of the experiment. As can be seen in Table 1, the data are ordered 
exactly in the predicted manner. Subjects in the HH-LL condition had the 
highest level of expectation advantage and the highest rate of stay-responses 
(.821) of any subjects in any other condition. Similarly, subjects in the 
HH-LH condition had the next highest level of expectation advantage and the 
next highest rate of stay-responses (.718). This pattern continues for the 
remaining three conditions. As the level of theoretical expectation advantage 
decreases, the proportion of stay-responses decreases: .661, .620, and .530.
Table 2 about here
Table 2 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney U tests for pairs of 
conditions which are adjacent in terms of their expectation advantage (e.g., 
HH-LL vs HH-HLO. These tests were carried out to determine whether minimal 
differences in expectation advantage were associated with significant 
differences in rates of stay-responses. While the tests do not yield .05 
significance for all comparisons, it seems evident that even slight changes 
in expectation advantage had a marked effect on the subjects' tendencies to 
stay with their own initial opinions. To the extent that statistical
Table 2
Mann-Whitney U Test for Adjacent Conditions
Adjacent Conditions
Test Statistics
U Z P
HH-LL* / HH-LH+ 197.00 2.76 .003
HH-LH+ / HL-LH* 281.50 1.25 .11
HL-LH* / LH-HH+ 233.50 1.10 .14
LH-HH+ / LL-HH* 184.00 1.77 .04
*Condition included in first experiment 
*Condition added for second experiment
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significance was not obtained for all comparisons, it is believed to be a 
function of the narrowness of the entire range of stay-responses.
In order to view the overall significance of the results, we applied the 
Jonckheere test for ordered means to the data for the five conditions. This 
is a non-parametric test which determines the likelihood that the order of the 
rates of stay-responses predicted by the combining mechanism could have 
occurred by chance. The probability of such an occurrence is computed at 
p < .001, so we can obviously reject the alternative hypothesis that the 
specific ordering of conditions was a chance occurrence.*
This analysis, however, does not completely rule out the balancing 
mechanism argument, which admits the possibility that the direction of the 
cognitive balance may not be uniform in each of the inconsistent conditions 
and that some subjects in these conditions may be balancing in the direction 
of forming high-self, low-other expectations while the rest are balancing in 
the direction of forming low-self, high-other states. If this occurred in 
proportions that varied by inconsistent conditions, the resultant mean rates 
of stay-responses for these inconsistent conditions could turn out to have 
the observed ordering. However, as noted previously, if this did occur there 
should be clear evidence of bi-modality in each of the inconsistent conditions. 
In order to examine additional data relevant to this problem, we present in 
Table 3 the frequency distributions of the number of stay-responses for each 
of the five conditions.
Table 3 about here
*In comparing this value we followed the conservative procedure of always 
breaking ties against the ordering hypothesis as recommended by Jonckheere 
(1954).
Table 3
Distribution of Stay-Responses for Each Condition
Number of 
Stay-Responses HH-LL* HH-LH+ HL-LH* LH-HH+ LL-hH*
1
•־
2
3
4 X
5
6 X
7 X X xxxx
8 X
9 X X X X
10 X X X XX X
11 X X X X X X X xxxxx
12 X X X X xxxxxx xxxx X X X
13 X X X X X X X X X xxxxx X X
14 X X X X xxxx XX
15 xxxxx X X X xxxx X X X X X
16 X X X X X X X X
17 xxxxxxx xxxxx X
18 xxxx X X X
19 X X
20 X X X X
* Condition included in first experiment 
+ Condition added for second experiment
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Although the numbers involved are small for a definitive judgment on this 
matter, the data presented in Table 3 give us no clearcut indication of bi­
modality in the three inconsistent conditions. In fact, the distributions for 
all conditions (with the possible exception of the LL-HH condition) look 
surprisingly similar in shape.* Thus on the basis of available evidence, we 
reject the argument that the observable ordering of rates of stay-responses 
is due to an aggregating of two populations of subjects whose proportions 
vary by inconsistent conditions and who are balancing in different directions.
We conclude that the data obtained from these experiments clearly favor 
the combining mechanism argument. The subjects of these experiments appear 
indeed to be operating on the information given to them about the states of 
the specific status characteristics each of them possesses in forming task 
expectations for self and other, and they use and combine all the relevant 
information that is available to them. Thus when the distribution of the 
states of the characteristics is inconsistent they tend to combine the states 
of the two characteristics in order to form "average" states.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the cumulative findings from two experi­
ments dealing with the problem of the emergence of power and prestige orders 
in multi-characteristic status situations. Our specific theoretical interest 
has been to determine how actors form performance expectations for self and
*Since all the subjects in the LL-HH condition were placed in a con­
sistent low state to begin with, the relatively high variance in this con­
dition cannot be taken as evidence for the balancing mechanism argument inso­
far as it applies to the problem of multiple characteristics. Rather, this 
high variance is believed to reflect the tension and resulting unstable 
behavior produced by the cumulative effect of the two low ability manipula­
tions employed in this condition.
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others given different distributions of specific status characteristics that 
are instrumental to their task.
We have considered two alternative mechanisms which may be operating in 
the formation of expectations in multi-characteristic task situations. The 
first, which we have referred to as a balancing mechanism, postulates that 
the actor cognitively defines the situation so as to form expectation states 
that correspond with a perceived distribution of states of characteristics 
that is consistent or univalent for each individual. The operation of this 
mechanism, in the situation we considered, would result in p's assigning one 
of two expectation states to self and to other, either "high" or "low." The 
second cognitive process we considered is one we have called a combining 
mechanism. This postulates that the actor forms his expectations by combining 
or averaging the performance information contained in the states of the status 
characteristics possessed by self and other. In our case, the operation of 
this mechanism would result in p's assigning to self and to other one of a 
large number of different expectations ranging from "high" to "low" and depend 
ing upon the particular distribution of status characteristics. In any 
event, once p has formed expectations, whether through the operation of a 
balancing or combining mechanism, his power and prestige position is assumed 
to be directly related to the expectation advantage he holds relative to his 
partner in the task situation.
The results of an initial experiment provided support for the combining 
mechanism argument. Since the possibility existed that these findings might 
have been restricted to a special multi-characteristic situation, we thought 
it desirable to investigate additional conditions. We conducted a second
experiment incorporating additional predictions and conditions, and our 
findings from both studies have been reported as a unit.
These experiments consisted of two phases. In the first we established 
and assigned the states of two specific status characteristics to two actors, 
who were then placed in a standardized experimental situation where we could 
measure the power and prestige ordering that developed. These experiments 
involved three separate distributions of two specific status characteristics, 
giving us five experimental conditions. In two conditions the distribution of 
status characteristics was consistent: HH-LL and LL-HH. In three of the 
conditions there was an inconsistency with respect to self, other, or both: 
HL-HH, HH-HL, HL-LH. The balancing and combining mechanisms make different 
predictions as to the behavior of subjects in the inconsistent conditions.
It is assumed, however, that whichever mechanism operates in inconsistent 
situations is also the mechanism which operates in consistent situations. 
Therefore, the results for consistent and inconsistent conditions were con­
sidered in discriminating between mechanisms.
The findings from the experiments support the combining mechanism argu­
ment. From our formulation of this argument we derived a specific predicted 
ordering of mean rates of acceptance of influence for the five conditions 
studied. Our experimental results revealed that this particular ordering did 
in fact obtain. It also appears to be the case that these results are not due 
to aggregating of responses over subjects who are balancing in radically 
different ways in inconsistent situations. Thus the cumulative data presented 
here argue strongly for the operation of a combining mechanism in multi­
characteristic status situations.
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We must, however, temper our conclusion. Preliminary results from 
further investigations into this problem suggest that our observed ordering 
may undergo change when interaction is extended. If this proves to be the 
case, it raises the more general question as to whether a combining state is 
an end or stable state, and under what conditions might it be expected to 
undergo change. This problem both merits and requires further investigation.
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